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EXECUTIVE DFTERMINATION AND ROLES AND MISSIONS

J

There is an alarming indication that increasing attention in the
Pentagon is being directed toward removing basic roles and missions of the
Armed Services from existing statute and making them subject only to executive
det ermination,
Such a move is being advocated under the guise of "strengthening 11
the Secretary of Defense and "streamlining" the Defense Department,
s t rengthen the executive agency.

This may

But it t-lill weaken legislative authority

and status in an area in which Congress has wisely and resolutely insisted
on the exercise of its prercgative and responsibility since the founding of
our country.
What are these "roles and missions"?

Briefly these constitute the

specific provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, amended, which set
forth the fundamental and basic roles and missions of each of the Armed Services,
I n a sense these provisions of law constitute a charter for each armed service,
a kind of directive from Congress stating the purpose for which Congress, in
accordance with its constitutional responsibility, creates, provides for, and
maintains each of the armed services,
It must be clearly understood that the statutory prescription of roles
and missions is not a detailed statement of the specific day-to-day jobs,
weapons, techniques, research projects and routine activities.

Rather, roles

and missions in law are stated in broad, flexible and elastic terms, which
do not make this statutory assignment of roles and missions a straightjacket, a restriction, or an impediment to scientific and technological progress.

I doubt if anyone today could prescribe in more fundament al and more
flexible terms the roles and missions of the armed services as they were
written into the National Security Act of 1947 with its subsequent amendment.
It must be clearly understood that the roles and missions of the
National Security Act are separate and distinct from the detailed assignment of

11

functions 11 of the Armed Services.

The functions of the Armed

Services are the details of the jobs and duties of the Armed Services, stated
in more specific terms than exists in law.

Essentially, the functions, which

are prescribed by the executive authority of the President or the Secretary
of Defense, are adjustable from time to time to new techniques, new weapons,
new scientific discoveries.

Such functions are amplificatinns of the basic

roles and missions prescribed by law.
So, in the combination of the wording of the roles and missions in
the National Security Act as written by Congress and the detailed, adjustable
assignment of specific functions by the executive, there is a completely
proper, workable, and successful device by which the legislative and the
executive can exercise appropriate authority with respect to what the Armed
Services are to do.
This matter of statutory prescriptions of rol es and missions is no
new issue.

In fact, it was probably the fundamental issue connected with

the National Security Act 0f 1947.

It certainly received more attention

from Congress in its consideration of that bill than any other feature of
that law.
I would like to briefly review

s~me

of the pertinent facts in connec-

tion with the inclusion of roles and missions in the National Security Act of

1947, as amended.
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As originally proposed, the National Security Act of
include the statutory outline of roles and missions.

1947 did not

Rather, it was proposed

that an executive order on roles and missions would be issued upon passage
of the security act.

However, Congress, in its

wisdom~

decided that it was

not only the right of Congress to prescribe basic roles and missions for the
Armed Services but it was an inescapable responsibility of Congress to so do.
Such an attitude on the part of Congress was not readily accepted by the executive sponsors of the proposed national security act.

Congress was resolute

in its position and set forth in properly worded provisions the fundamental
roles and missions of each of the Armed Services.
I would like to point out that Congress, alert to the practical
realities of defense matters, recognized that two elements of the Armed Services
were in jeopardy.

Because they considered those elements to be necessary to the

attainment of a properly balanced defense organization and because such jeopardy
should not be permitted to continue, Congress was more precise in the
prescription of roles and missions for naval aviation and the Marine Corps.
Congress reaffirmed in even more emphatic terms, through Public
Law

416, 82d Congress, 2d Session, its insistence upon a continued maintenance

of a combat ready Marine Corps as a national force in readiness.

Congress

underlined its attitude and determination in this respect by stating that the
Commandant of the Marine Corps should have coequal status with other members
of the JCS in consideration of all matters pertaining to the Marine Corps and
that, among other provisions, the Marine Corps should be maintained at a strength
of three combat divisions and three air wings.
It was perfectly obvious at that time that powerful factions within
the Armed Services bitterly opposed this Congressional decision.
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There is not the slightest doubt in my mind but what the Marine Corps
will be destroyed as a combat force in readiness if present efforts to remove
roles and missions from the law are successful.

There is no place for the

Marine Corps as it has developed, as Congress wants it, and as the country
needs it, in the master plan of those who wish to centralize all military
authority under somebody in the Pentagon.
It is just as certain that our balanced naval power, with its unsurpassed naval aviation, as well as its Marine landing forces, will be destroyed
if the roles and missions are removed from statute. We will find the United
States, which is in fact an island nation dependent upon maritime power for
economic and military survival, possessing a Navy which no longer will contain
the unique American attribute of sea power -- the balanced fleet.
This effort -- and it is a persistent one -- to remove
sions from law is not only a matter of military importance.

r~les a~nd

It is

~r

mis-

basic

constitutional importance which is impossible to over-emphasize in matters of
legislative - executive relationship.

In a practical sense the statutory

prescription of roles and missions is one of the few meaningful instruments
by which Congress can discharge its proper responsibility with respect to
defense policy.

If roles and missions for the Armed Services, as now prescribed

by law, are removed from existing statute and made subject to executive whim,
little will remain for Congress to do except appropriate monies for the Pentagon.
This effort, which is gaining momentum within the Pentagon today,
is one of the most fundamental issues of our times.

Congress could not, and

I predict will not, look lightly or casually upon attempts to divest Congress
of its authority and its responsibility to prescribe these basic roles and
missions.

Those persons who have, since 1947, refused to accept the decision

of Congress to include roles and missions in the National Security Act must not
be permitted to succeed with their efforts to undo this Congressional decision.
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There has not, in recent years, been a more clearcut manifestation
of a Congressional mandate in defense policies than the Congressional determination to prescribe roles and missions rather than leave it to the executive.
I don't believe that Congress will permit this Pentagon power play to
succeed.

I do not believe that Congress and the American people will ever

permit the Pentagon to erase the statutory safeguards that assure
existence of the Marines as an ever-ready combat force.
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